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T

Hu failure to recognize a distinction between the absence
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because of
a defective service of process and the absence of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant because of a defective complaint, has created unnecessary confusion and uncertainties
in the law of practice in New York State. The Court of Appeals, as well as the statutes and rules of procedure, recognize and treat the two objections independently of each other.
Nevertheless, many lower courts frequently base their decisions on the assumption that, since the objection concerns a
want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, it
makes no difference whether the defendant's objection consists of an irregular or unlawful service, or, on the other
hand, an objection solely directed to the alleged cause of action. This situation arises most frequently in connection
with the effect of the defendant's voluntary general appearance. Commonly, the defendant's objection will be disposed
of in the following language, "The objection raised by the
defendant is that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but it is the law of this state that such
objection can be waived by a general appearance. If the
objection herein were as to the cause of action, the result
would be otherwise, but, since defendant has appeared, he
has conferred jurisdiction over his person and, therefore, the
motion must be denied." It is the purpose of this article to
point out under what circumstances the above decision may
be perfectly sound law and to demonstrate under what factual
situations the decision would be, if not actually ridiculous,
at least unsound law.
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There are only two methods provided for the commencement of a civil action and, manifestly, if the one or the other
is not employed, no judgment can be made or given therein.
A thing not commenced cannot be finished. The practice
act provides that a civil action may be commenced by the
service of a summons on the defendant therein.1 It also
provides that a voluntary general appearance is equivalent
to the personal service of a summons.2 It will be noted as
to these two methods, that the first calls for affirmative acts
on the plaintiff's part which must conform to statutory requirements and that the second looks to conduct on defendant's part sufficient to imply an assent to a judicial determination of a controversy between parties. Both methods
are not essential to commence the action. Frequently, we
find the plaintiff taking the initiative but not succeeding in
his attempt because of some omission or defect where, nevertheless, the court will hold that the action has been duly
commenced under the second method. In such instance it
will be said jurisdiction is acquired by defendant's consent.
In making provision for the commencement of the action
under the first method, the legislature has enacted requirements that increase and become more complicated, depending
upon who the person is that plaintiff intends to make a party
defendant and the type of service which plaintiff will employ.
Statutes must conform to defendant's constitutional right of
due process and plaintiffs who fail to comply with these
statutory enactments will not succeed in bringing their controversy before a court of justice. Consequently, as statutory
enactments increase, the possibility of error and omission on
plaintiff's part accelerates. The service provided for may be
personal or constructive 3 and the latter includes a substitute service, service by publication, service on non-resident
motorists, 4 service on appointed state officers as agents for
foreign corporations licensed to do business in this state and,
possibly, service on non-resident individuals doing business
'N. Y. Civ. PARC. AcT § 218.
2Id.

§237.

3 Id. art. 25.
4 N. Y. VEHICLE

& TRA1ric

LAW

§ 52.
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here. 5 Even in the simple cases of personal service upon
individuals the exactions vary. Service upon the adult differs from service upon the infant. Service upon the adjudicated incompetent differs from service upon the incompetent
who has not been legally adjudicated as such. Then too,
service upon the domestic corporation differs greatly from
service upon the foreign corporation and as to the latter, a
difference exists depending upon whether or not the corporation is licensed to do business in this state. If plaintiff
seeks to commence his action by resorting to one of the constructive services, the statutory requirements are even more
exacting and plaintiff more frequently is called upon to establish his conformity thereto in order to sustain the validity
of the service. In these instances the problem presented to
the court is first to ascertain whether or not there has been
an omission or defect and secondly to determine whether it
is an irregularity or a jurisdictional defect. In the latter
case jurisdiction of the defendant is not acquired and the
action is not commenced.
It has been noted, however, that defendant's conduct may
be construed as a voluntary general appearance and, conceding the omission or defect to be jurisdictional, the court
may find against the defendant because the second method
may overcome the objection raised under the first method.
Defendant's general appearance is the equivalent of personal
service. This appearance may be found in many ways. Defendant may have served a formal notice of appearance, or
an answer or a notice of motion raising an objection in point
of law.0 He may have otherwise participated in the merits
of the controversy so that it may be said of him, that becoming an actor in the controversy in a substantial sense, he
has consented that the court has acquired jurisdiction of his
person.7 It would now be too late to complain. To avoid
any inference of assent by defendant to a judicial determination of the controversy, defendant must make a special appearance and solely to object to plaintiff's attempt to comi

5 N. Y. Civ. PnRA AcT § 229-b; see Prashker, Service of Summons on
Non-Resident Natural Persons Doing Business in New York (1940) 15 ST.
JoHN's
L. REv. 1.
6
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 237.
7Henderson v. Henderson, 247 N. Y. 428, 160 N. E. 775 (1928).
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mence the action under the first method. He must limit
himself strictly to this question. He is not even permitted
to demand a copy of the complaint. 8 If he so protects himself under the special appearance the court must then determine the regularity of the service. If the service is irregular and not in conformity with the statutory requirements
the spurious service is vacated and no action has been commenced against the defendant. Consequently neither plaintiff nor defendant is entitled to a judgment which must be
the determination of the rights between the parties. Rights
or liabilities in an action cannot be determined between a
plaintiff and a person not yet made a party. It is under
these circumstances and in instances where the defective
service is cured by a voluntary general appearance, that the
decision stated above would represent sound law.
Is there a recognized objection that the court has no
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant which applies only
to the cause of action alleged in the complaint? If so, is the
objection independent of the same named objection applicable
to improper service of process? Is the rule of waiver and
consent or voluntary general appearance applicable to this
objection?
That there does exist such objection appears to be so
well established that it should be accepted as a self-evident
truth. The objection is neither related to the service of
process nor the jurisdiction of the subject matter. It does
exist whenever the Constitution of the United States, or the
constitution of a particular state or a statute imposes a limitation on a given court respecting the exercise of judicial
power in an action and the limitation is a factor peculiar to
the person of the defendant.
Under the Constitution of the United States, the original
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is limited
to actions in which a state is a party and to cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers or consuls. Here there
are no limitations as to the subject matter nor the nature of
the remedy sought.9 The only requirement is that either one
8

Muslusky v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 225 N. Y. 584, 122 N. E. 775

(1919).
9
U. S. CoNsT. Art III.
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or the other jurisdictional fact pertaining to the parties must
appear. It would be absurd to argue that consent of the
parties could under any circumstances waive the objection
and confer authority upon the court to act.
When the Congress, pursuant to the United States Constitution, established and created the United States District
Court, it enacted limitations to the exercise of judicial power,
some of which related to the person of the defendant. In
actions wherein the complaint demands money damages only,
the District Court can acquire jurisdiction provided there is
diversity of citizenship. The important question is a factor
pertaining to the person of the defendant. The subject matter of the action definitely has no bearing on the question.
Two actions might be identical, one against a citizen of the
plaintiff's state and the other against a citizen of another
state. The first action would have to be disposed of in the
state court and the second might be heard and judgment rendered in the Federal Court. No one would argue, that by
defendant's consent, the parties might accomplish that which
Congress has denied. The jurisdictional fact is in no way
connected with the service of process or the commencement
of the action. It is a factor pertaining to the defendant and
an integral part of the action. It must be established to
validate the judgment.
In New York State there exists both constitutional and
statutory limitations on the exercise of judicial power. Many
of these limitations relate to the subject matter, others to
the nature of the remedy sought, and others to the person of
the defendant. All, however, are jurisdictional facts which
must be alleged and proved.
The New York Supreme Court, under the state constitution, exercises general jurisdiction in law and equity.
Nevertheless, there are statutory limitations. For example,
under Section 225 of the General Corporation Law, it is provided that the Supreme Court may exercise jurisdiction only
in certain specified actions when the controversy is between
a non-resident or foreign corporation plaintiff and against
a foreign corporation defendant. In respect to contracts
made in New York or affecting property situated in New
York at the time the contract was made, an action to re-

6
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cover money damages for a breach might be brought, but
specific performance or reformation or any other equitable
relief would not be within the court's jurisdiction. In this
instance the jurisdictional fact relates to the remedy sought.
In the same section it is provided that an action may be
brought to recover real or personal property situated in New
York. The limitation applies to the subject matter and the
objection could be taken that the court lacks jurisdiction of
the subject matter. Another limitation applies to the person
of the defendant and the jurisdictional fact required is that
the foreign corporation is doing business within the state.
In all of these instances, consent of the parties cannot waive
the essential jurisdictional fact and none of these requirements is connected with the commencement of the action by
service or consent.
The County Courts exercising civil jurisdiction in the
counties outside of New York City, have many limitations
on their exercise of judicial power. 10 This court is vested
with authority to foreclose mortgages upon real property
situated within the county but cannot exercise judicial power
to reform the mortgage for mutual mistake. This limitation
pertains to the remedy sought. Consent of the parties cannot confer authority and if the court proceeded the judgment
would be void." The objection is independent of the commencement of the action by service or consent. The defendant is no longer a stranger to the controversy but, rather,
a party to an action. As to him the court is authorized to
determine rights or fix liabilities. So, in an action for money
damages, the court has jurisdiction providing the damages
do not exceed $3,000. The limitations here pertain to the
ubject matter. Consent of the parties cannot confer judicial authority. If the complaint demands $6,000 no jurisdiction exists permitting plaintiff to amend the complaint to
demand an amount within the limitations. As in arithmetic,
so in law, one-half of nothing is nothing and can never be
otherwise. The constitution and legislature in this type of
action has added a further jurisdictional fact, to wit, the
defendant or defendants must reside in the county where the
ION. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 67.
12 Thomas v. Harmon, 122 N. Y. 84, 25 N. E. 257 (1890).
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action is brought. 2 The limitation here pertains to the person of the defendant as it does in the United States Supreme
Court and the Federal District Court. So, again, in this
instance there is no reason why consent of the parties can
substitute that which the legislature requires. Again, the
objection has no connection with the commencement of the
action. It is a jurisdictional fact essential to the exercise of
judicial power by the court.
If reference is made to the Rules of Procedure and the
Practice Act the distinction between jurisdiction of the person of the defendant in connection with the service of process
and the allegation in the complaint is also apparent. Rule
106 provides that defendant may make a motion for judgment, dismissing the complaint for various objections appearing on the face of the pleading, including the objection that
on its face the complaint shows that the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. The court would have
no authority to enter a judgment if the action had never been
commenced. The question of defendant's consent is not before the court. The judgment is the final determination of
the rights of the parties, and although not res adjudicat,
is an adjudication. All of the other objections under Rule
106 pertain to the complaint and it would be illogical and
unreasonable to treat this objection as an exception applying
to the service of the summons. Similar provision is made
under Rule 107, except in this instance the objections do not
appear on the face of the pleading and, therefore, defendant
is permitted to use affidavits to explain the objections. Again,
the determination, if in defendant's favor, is a judgment for
defendant dismissing the complaint.
In a decision by the Court of Appeals this distinction
was made with precision and discernment almost one hundred years ago. In the case of Burcide v. Eckhart, 3 one of
the questions decided was the jurisdiction of the vicechancellor. The statutory limitation required residence within the circuit. On page 137, the court said:
The jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law, and in no case by
consent of parties. When jurisdiction of the subject and person is
2
Art. VI, § 11.
13 Burckle v. Eckhart, 3 N. Y. 132 (1849).

1 N. Y. CoNsT.
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required as a prerequisite to judicial action, a defendant may waive
any irregularities in the mode by which his person is sought to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court, by a voluntary appearance. He
may dispense with the service of process, as he may waive any other
personal privilege. But when defendant is in court as a party, the
law gives jurisdiction of the person, without regard to the question
whether his appearance was voluntary or by compulsion. This is all
that is meant by giving jurisdiction of the person, and all that is
decided in the cases to which we have been referred. (Words in
italics in opinion.)

From these considerations it is apparent that there does
exist a distinction between the two objections concerning the
absence of jurisdiction of the person of defendant and that
they are necessarily independent of each other.
Finally, is the rule of waiver and consent or voluntary
general appearance limited to improper service of the summons? In this connection there exists no doubt that the defendant's conduct can and does correct an irregular or defective service of the summons. His voluntary appearance is a
manifestation of cancelling any jurisdictional defects in the
service. Therefore, the action is deemed commenced and the
defendant is made a part thereto. But what is the situation
when the objection pertains to the complaint? The Court of
Appeals in the Muslusky case 14 has limited the special appearance to objections concerning the service of the process
and defendant can and ought not be permitted to be heard on
questions arising as to the pleading. However, objections to
the pleading founded on the lack of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant may and do arise. Our statutes and
rules of practice provide for such contingency and the Court
of Appeals recognizes their existence. How may defendant
proceed if the court must apply the rule that a voluntary
general appearance waives this objection? Assume that defendant does not serve a notice of general appearance but
merely a notice of motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds stated. This procedure can afford him no protection
because the Practice Act provides 15 that the service of a
notice of motion raising an objection in point of law is equiv14 See note 8 supra.
15 See note 6 supra.
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alent to the notice of general appearance. If the defendant attempts to take the objection as a defense in his
answer, again, he is not protected. The Civil Practice
Act also provides that the service of an answer is the
equivalent of a service of a notice of general appearance. 16
Thus the defendant is confronted with this dilemma. If
he serves the notice of special appearance, he will preserve his appearance but cannot be heard on his objection.
If he will be heard on his objection and raises the same
by either motion or answer, his relief will be denied because his general appearance has waived the objection pertaining to the person of the defendant. If the court still insists that a general appearance waives this objection, another
peculiar iesult follows. Assume the action is commenced in
the Oneida County Court by the service of the summons without the complaint, and defendant having no objection to the
service, because it conforms strictly to the statutory requirements, serves his notice of general appearance with the usual
demand. On receipt of the complaint defendant learns for
the first time that the complaint demands a money judgment
for 2,500 and alleges his residence in Herkimer County. The
defendant's proper remedy would be to move to dismiss the
complaint for want of jurisdiction of the person. Is relief to
be denied because of the service of the notice of general appearance? As one scholarly judge so aptly stated in a different situation:
Such a holding would not only bring a reproach upon the administration of justice, but would be an impeachment of the universal
dictates of common sense. It requires no other knowledge of the law
than to know that its basis is reason
and justice, to be able to deter17
mine the right of this question.
In Davidburghv'v. KnickerboAker Life lnsurance Co,1B1
the action was brought in the City Court of Brooklyn against
a domestic corporation having its principal place of business
in New York City. The defendant appeared generally in the
action, and in no manner before trial complained that it was
not regularly in court, or that the court had not jurisdiction
a Ibid.
17 Bulkley v. Bulkley, 6 Abb. Pr. 307 (N. Y. 1858).
18 Davidsburgh v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 90 N. Y. 526 (1882).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 17

either over it or the cause of action. The court said on page
529:
In the present case the defendant did not take the objection by
its answer, but at the end of the plaintiff's case. The point of time
does not seem material. The court could not acquire jurisdiction by
consent, and might, whenever its attention was called to the defect in
the proceedings, refuse to exceed the powers conferred by the law of
its creation. There are, no doubt, many cases where the court, having jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may proceed against a defendant who voluntarily submits to its decision; but where the state
prescribes conditions under which a court may act, these conditions
cannot be dispensed with by litigants, for in such a case the particular
condition or status of the defendant is made a jurisdictional fact. (Italics are new.)
If, in the hypothetical decision stated above, the factual
situation presented an objection to the lack of jurisdiction of
the person of the defendant respecting a defect in the complaint, it is apparent that the decision is not sound law.
It may be that the apparent error and resulting confusion is due to Section 278 of the Civil Practice Act which
does provide under what circumstances an objection to the
complaint may be waived if not taken by motion. The objections include:
(a) That the court has not jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant in cases where jurisdiction may be
acquired by his consent;
(b) That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue;
(c) That another action is pending between the parties
for the same cause;
(d) That there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff;
(e) That there is a defect of parties, plaintiff or defendant.
It must always be borne in mind that under all of these circumstances, there can be a waiver only when the objection
appears on the face of the complaint. If the objection does
exist but it is not apparent on the face of the pleading, the
objection might be taken as a defense in the answer or by
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motion. There is a further limitation in respect to defendant's waiver. In Section 279 it is provided that an objection
as to the jurisdiction of the court, except as provided for in
section 278, is not waived by failure to raise the same before
trial.19 Now the only objection "to the jurisdiction of the
Court" found in Section 278 and applicable to the complaint
is under subdivision (a), "want of jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant", and that is again limited by itself, to the
instances "where the jurisdiction may be acquired by his
consent". Reading the two sections together, it may be
said, if
(1) the objection appears on the face of the complaint,
and is
(2) that the court has not jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant, and is
(3) a case where jurisdiction (of the court) may be acquired by his (the defendant's) consent:
then the defendant must take the objection by motion. If he
fails, he has no right to object. The court, of course, is not
limited by this section and on its own initiative may proceed
to grant such relief as to it may seem just and proper.
Again, a necessary corollary follows from Sections 278
and 279.
(1) If the objection does not appear on the face of the
complaint or
(2) If the objection is that the court has no jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant and is also
(3) A case where jurisdiction of the court may not be
acquired by his (defendant's) consent, then the objection
may be taken under Section 279
(a) by motion
'9 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 279: Certain Objection Not Waived. An ob-

jection as to the jurisdiction of the court, except as otherwise provided in the
preceding section, and the objection that a complaint, or a statement herein of
a separate cause of action, or a counterclaim, does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, or that a defense is insufficient in law upon the
face thereof, are not waived by' failure to raise the same before trial.
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(b) as a defense in the answer
(c) at the trial.
It would therefore follow that whenever a factor pertaining to the person of the defendant becomes a condition
to the exercise of judicial power, it ripens into a jurisdictional fact entirely independent of defendant's control or
consent. If the fact does not exist, the court lacks authority
to pronounce a judgment in the action. Section 278 does not
apply in such instances because the jurisdiction cannot be
acquired by defendant's consent. Defendant may raise the
objection by motion, in his answer or at the trial. The court,
not being limited by Section 278, should rule on the objection
whenever the defect is called to its attention.
What are the objections that may be made and will be
waived if not taken by motion under Section 278? The New
York Supreme Court may entertain an action by a non-resident plaintiff against a non-resident defendant to recover
damages for a tort committed outside the state. A discretion
is vested in the court as to whether or not it will proceed with
the action. 20 The objection definitely does not pertain to the
remedy plaintiff is seeking or the subject matter of the action, but involves a factor pertaining to the defendant, to
wit: his non-residence. If this objection appears on the face
of the complaint under Section 278, plaintiff must take it by
motion. It is an objection that the court has not jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant where the jurisdiction can be
acquired by consent. Prior to the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, the defendant might take such objection by demurrer, by answer or at the time of trial. In the case of Burdick
v. Freeman21 the objection was raised at the conclusion of
the trial and, although denied for laches, there was no criticism respecting defendant's practice. It might be reiterated
that if the objection did not appear on the face of the complaint, it might be taken by motion, answer, or at the time
of the trial, since it is an objection to the want of jurisdiction of the court, and Section 279 does apply.
Again, in an action brought by a non-resident or foreign
20 Burdick v. Freeman, 120 N. Y. 420, 291 N. E. 949 (1890).
21 See note 20 supra.
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corporation against another foreign corporation doing business within the state, to recover damages for a tort occurring
outside the state, the court has discretion whether or not it
will entertain the suit.2 2 If the objection appears on the face

of the complaint, defendant must take it by motion or defendant is deemed to have waived it. If the objection does not so
appear, defendant may take it under Rule 107 or by a defense
in its answer, or raise the objection at the trial of the action.
So too, in actions instituted in the county courts, the
defendant may reside in the county where an action for
money damages has been instituted. The residence satisfies
the jurisdictional fact essential to the court's exercise of
judicial power. However, the complaint may omit the allegation. Jurisdiction might be acquired by consent and, therefore, under the Civil Practice Act, the objection appearing on
the face of the complaint, the defendant must raise it by
motion. It will be too late to interpose the objection as a
defense in the answer or upon the trial. In the case of People
,P. Bailey,2 3 Mr. Justice M. Kellogg stated this principle
clearly and concisely. On page 619 he said:
The County Court has no jurisdiction of an original action
brought therein, unless the defendant is a resident of the county.
Section 14, art. 6, CONST. N. Y.: CODE CIV. PROC. 340. Consent of
the parties will not confer jurisdiction where the statute or Constitution has actually denied it. In this case, therefore, if the defendant
had not been a resident of the county of Albany, the judgment against
him could not stand. The defendant was in fact a resident of that
county, and therefore the plaintiff had the right to bring this action
against him to recover the penalties sought. As the defendant was a
resident of the county, we are remitted to a simple question of practice, and may safely assume that the plaintiff should have alleged in
his complaint the facts showing that the County Court could entertain
the action.
A question of practice may be waived, and a suitor by his laches
may put himself in a position where he cannot take advantage of a
mistake in the practice of his adversary. In Bunker v. Langs, 76
Hun 543, 28 N. Y. Supp. 210 the defendant was actually a resident of
the county, but the complaint in the county court did not allege that
22 Waikoski v. Philadelphia & Reading C. & I. Co., 173 App. Div. 538,

159 N. Y. Supp. 906 (1916), af'd, 228 N. Y. 581 (1920).
23 People v. Bailey, 136 App. Div. 130, 120 N. Y. Supp. 618 (1909).
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fact. The defendant answered without raising any question as to the
omission in the complaint, and it was held that he had waived the
question and was not able to take advantage of it upon the trial.
That case establishes that the defendant has waived in this case the
right to take any advantage on account of the omission in the complaint. In Henneke v. Schmidt, 121 App. Div. 516, 106 N. Y. Supp.
138, the defendant was a resident of the county, but the complaint did
not allege the fact, and upon the trial the court dismissed the action,
holding that it had not jurisdiction to try it or to allow the plaintiff to
amend his complaint. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment, holding the trial court had the power to grant the amendment,
and should have done so. In effect that case treats the matter as we
do, as one of practice if the defendant is in fact a resident of the
county. If the question was waived, it was not error to receive evidence that the defendant resided in the county, and, if necessary, the
court should have permitted the amendment to the complaint which
the plaintiff asked and to which the defendant objected. The defendant is not therefore in a position to urge that he has been prejudiced
with reference to these matters.
Defendants engaged in interstate commerce are guaranteed rights under the United States Constitution, against
unreasonable and oppressive burdens upon their business of
interstate or foreign commerce. If, in an action against such
defendant, it definitely appears that orderly and effective
administration of justice does not justify the maintenance of
the action in the state, the court will refuse to exercise jurisdiction. The explanation here is not that the Federal Government has created a jurisdictional limitation to the exercise of judicial power by the state courts. Article 10 of the
amendments prevents any such construction, but rather, that
the Federal Government has conferred this privilege upon
defendants so situated as an incident to the exercise of the
absolute power vested in the Federal Government to regulate
and control interstate and foreign commerce. It is a factor
pertaining to the person of the defendant but it is not and
cannot be made a jurisdictional fact. If the objection appears
on the face of the complaint, under Section 278, the defendant would be obliged to take the same by motion and could
not interpose it in his answer or at the trial. But the United
States Supreme Court has held in the case of Michigan (en,-
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tral Railroad v. MiM 2 4 that, "no local rule of practice could
prevent the carrier from laying the appropriate foundation
for the enforcement of its constitutional right by taking a
seasonable motion." By judicial decision, therefore, this objection to the want of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is treated as one where jurisdiction cannot be had
by consent under Section 278 of the Civil Practice Act. The
defendant may raise the same by motion, answer, or at the
trial. There are, therefore, many instances where the objection may be waived by consent under Section 278 but they do
not and cannot include instances where the constitution or
the legislature requires a factor of the defendant to establish
a jurisdictional fact before the court is authorized to exercise
judicial power.
The following cases illustrate the confusion that results
from the failure to distinguish between the two objections
pertaining to the want of jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant.
In the case of Davidoff v. Rogew Wurmser, Ino., 5 the
action was commenced in the county court and the complaint
demanded judgment for a sum of money. There was no allegation as to the defendant's residence within the county. The
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant was denied. The court found jurisdiction had
been acquired by waiver or consent. The defendant's service
of the answer constituted the waiver of the defense in this
case. The court said on page 557.
In the instant case, the defendant served an answer on the mer-

its which did not raise the question of jurisdiction of the person. Such
an answer is equivalent to a general notice of appearance. See CIVIL
PRACTICcE AcT § 237. To be sure, the defendant, four or five days
later, served an amended answer in which there was set up as a defense the Court's lack of jurisdiction of the defendant's person by
reason of the failure of the complaint so to allege. However, I can
see no distinction between this case and the case where the defendant,
after filing a general notice of appearance, moves to dismiss for the
24
Michigan
25

Central Ry. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492, 49 Sup. Ct 207 (1929).
David v. Roger Wurmser, Inc., 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 555 (1941).
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jurisdictional defect with respect to the person of the defendant and is
held to have waived his rights so to do.

Here the question was not as to the commencement of the
action under such circumstances that defendant's consent
might become material, but rather, concerned a jurisdictional
fact, constituting a limitation on the exercise of judicial
power. The fact was required by the legislature and beyond
the control or consent of the parties.
The Appellate Division of the Second Department unanimously affirmed the order without opinion.
In the case of Gardnerv. Condon,2 6 the action was commenced in the Bronx County to recover money damages only.
The complaint failed to allege that defendant resided in
Bronx County. As a matter of fact, defendant was a resident
of Queens County. The defendant served a notice of appearance and then moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. The motion was denied because of defendant's waiver
or consent. In this case, the waiver was found because of the
service of the notice of appearance in the action. The court
said on page 757:
In this case before me, defendant served what is commonly
called a general notice of appearance. In other words, he appears
generally in the action. By so doing he waives his right to question
the jurisdiction of the Court over his person. Had he wished to
reserve that right, he should have appeared specially. Muslusky v.

Lehigh Valley Co., 225 N. Y. 584, 122 N. E. 461.
But the Court of Appeals, in the Muslusky case, 27 held that
under a special appearance the defendant was not even entitled to receive a copy of the complaint, and certainly not
permitted to make motions in reference thereto. Again, as
in the Davidoff case, the question did not concern the commencement of the action, but the presence of a jurisdictional
fact and consisting of a factor pertaining to the person of the
defendant.
In the case of Yager v. Yager,28 the complaint in an ac26

Gardner v. Condon, 17 Misc. 97, 190 N. Y. Supp. 756 (1921).

27 See note 8 sapra.
28

Yager v. Yager, 214 App. Div. 671, 212 N. Y. Supp. 707 (1925).
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tion in the County Court of Erie County contained no allegation as to the residence of the defendant. The defendant
appeared specially and moved to dismiss on the sole ground
that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. The court held the proper objection was
one of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and not
the insufficiency of the complaint. The motion was therefore
denied. The dicta in the case is confusing for the court states
the rule of thumb that, "a general appearance in an action
in the County Court waives the defect". This dicta is cited
as authority in the two preceding cases. The special appearance interposed by the defendant to raise the objection under
Rule 106 is meaningless. It amounts to saying this: "I
specially appear to make a motion, the making of which under
Sec. 237 of the Civil Practice Act is the equivalent of a general appearance."
In the case of Meyers v. American Locomotive CO., 2 9 the
action for negligence was brought in the County Court of
Chautauqua County against a domestic corporation. The
complaint alleged that defendant "has, operates and maintins one of its plants, shops or factories at Dunkirk, Chautauqua County. Defendant did not deny the allegation. The
Appellate Division unanimously affirmed a judgment for
plaintiff but an appeal to the Court of Appeals was allowed
by one of the judges on the express ground that the case of
Bunker v.Langs 30 had been questioned in other judicial decisions. The Bunker case held that an omission to allege in
the complaint in a County Court action that defendant was
a resident of such county is waived where the defendant appears and answers on the merits without objection. The defendant actually resided within Steuben County where the
action was commenced. The jurisdictional fact was, therefore, satisfied and plaintiff was granted leave to amend the
complaint to include the necessary omission. The Court of
Appeals approved the decision in the Bunker case and affirmed the judgment for plaintiff in the Meyers case. It is
true the opinion contains statements implying that a waiver
might have the effect of dispensing with a jurisdictional fact
29 Meyers v. American Locomotive Co., 201 N. Y. 163 (1911).
3
0 Bunker v. Langs, 76 Hun 543 (N. Y. 1894).
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but the authorities relied upon clearly do not sustain such
rule. Reference was made to Clapp v. Graves 31 and McCormick v. Penn. Central R. R. Co.,32 both cases holding, in connection with a defective service of summons, the defendant's
voluntary general appearance waived the objection. Definitely these cases are not authorities for objections pertaining to a complaint. Unfortunately, the Meyers case is responsible for some of the uncertainties that now exist
concerning this rule of practice.
The practice discussed herein is simple, accurate and
sure. Difficulties arise only when a rule of thumb is sought
to be applied to a repugnant factual situation. This swerving
from the definite path of practice has created uncertainties
and confusion. The path must again be made straight. If
decisions as illustrated above continue, the path will soon be
obliterated, and from a forest of upturned faces, the Bench,
the Bar and the Litigants, with one mouth will exclaim
"Vox Clamantis in Deserto" !
WILLIAM TAPLEY.

Professor of Law,
St. John's University, School of Law.

3' Clapp v. Graves, 26 N. Y. 418 (1863).
32

McCormick v. Penn. Central R. R., 49 N. Y. 303 (1872).

